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MATERIALIZING CITIZENSHIP: FINANCE IN A
PRODUCERS’ REPUBLIC
Robert Hockett*
ABSTRACT
Professor Hockett finds that Professor Baradaran’s helpful new article is,
in effect, largely about the institutional consequences of abandoning the oncedominant view of finance as the means by which to secure individual initiative
and productive autonomy in our polity. Professor Hockett argues that a tight
link exists between how we configure and conduct our enterprise and how we
configure and conduct our finance. He argues further that we cannot fully
describe what an optimally inclusive and sustainable banking and broader
financial system would look like without also identifying an optimally
participatory productive culture and attendant mode of capital accumulation.
INTRODUCTION
“[B]anks . . . enable honest and industrious men, of small or perhaps
of no capital to undertake and prosecute business, with advantage to
themselves and to the community . . . .”
1
—A. Hamilton
“Dependence begets subservience and venality, suffocates the germ
of virtue, and prepares fit tools for the designs of ambition.”
2
—T. Jefferson
* Professor of Business and Financial Law, Cornell Law School; Founding Board Member, The Occupy
Money Cooperative; Fellow, The Century Foundation; recent Consulting Counsel, International Monetary
Fund; and recent Resident Scholar, Federal Reserve Bank of New York. Many thanks to Greg Alexander, Dan
Alpert, Kaushik Basu, Ellen Brown, Mike Campbell, Chris Desan, Rashmi Dyal-Chand, Bob Frank, David
Grewal, Stephanie Kelton, Jeff Madrick, Brad Miller, Yxta Murray, Jeff Purdy, Aziz Rana, John Roemer,
Nouriel Roubini, Sherle Schweninger, Michael Sherraden, Bob Shiller, Bill Simon, Joe Singer, Sascha Somek,
Peter Spiegler, Art Wilmarth, Randy Wray, and especially Saule Omarova for many helpful discussions over
the subject of this Essay. Thanks also to Mehrsa Baradaran and Justin Russo for inviting and editing this Essay
with generosity and acuity.
1 Alexander Hamilton, Report on a National Bank, in ALEXANDER HAMILTON: WRITINGS 575, 585
(2001); see also id. at 599 (“[A] Bank is not a mere matter of private property, but a political machine of the
greatest importance to the State.”).
2 See Thomas Jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia, in THOMAS JEFFERSON: WRITINGS 123, 290–91
(1984). Note that “ambition” in the present context is a pejorative term, pertaining to persons with
antirepublican, tyrannical designs. See sources cited infra note 3.
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I. TWO FALLS FROM REPUBLICAN GRACE
The two epigrams with which I open this Essay reflect a rare convergence
of view between two notoriously antagonistic American founders, whose
ambitions for their new nation’s future are often observed to have been
antithetical.3 What the two statesmen shared, notwithstanding their differences,
was a view of the place of individual initiative and productive autonomy in an
enduring republic, and of the place of finance in assuring that both remain ever
available, on equitable terms, to productive republican citizens. Mehrsa
Baradaran’s helpful new article is, in effect, largely about the institutional
consequences of our having lost sight of this once-dominant view of the role of
finance in our polity.4 Yet it is also, I believe, for that very reason in part about
how we’ve lost sight of the centrality of both work and productive autonomy to
citizenship itself in what once was, and can once again be, our productive
republic.5
Let me begin with an illustrative personal anecdote.6 During the late 1990s,
I was writing a dissertation on the effects of a shifting global division of labor
on American income, asset accumulation, and home-owning patterns. While
writing, ironically, I began noticing large numbers of homeless adults in my
city. Soon I began to engage with these folk on a more or less superficial but
nonetheless day-to-day basis. After some weeks of this, it began to strike me as
3

For more on these visions and why they are ultimately best viewed as mutually supportive, see Robert
Hockett, A Jeffersonian Republic by Hamiltonian Means: Values, Constraints, and Finance in the Design of a
Comprehensive and Contemporary American “Ownership Society,” 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 45, 49–55 (2005)
[hereinafter Hockett, Jeffersonian Republic]; Robert Hockett, What Kinds of Stock Ownership Plans Should
There Be? Of ESOPs, Other SOPs, and “Ownership Societies,” 92 CORNELL L. REV. 865, 868 (2007)
[hereinafter Hockett, Stock Ownership Plans]; and Robert Hockett, Whose Ownership? Which Society?, 27
CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 3 (2005) [hereinafter Hockett, Whose Ownership?].
4 See Mehrsa Baradaran, How the Poor Got Cut Out of Banking, 62 EMORY L.J. 483, 486–87 (2013), to
which the present Essay is an appreciative invited response.
5 “Productive republic” and “producers’ republic” figure as interchangeable terms of art in what follows.
A producers’ republic is a polity constituted by citizens who enjoy more or less equal material opportunity to
engage in productive activity yielding sufficient remuneration as to enjoy rough material autonomy, which
latter in turn enables them to participate meaningfully both in the governance of the polity itself and in
productive decision-making within the firms through which they earn their livelihoods. In effect, then, a
producers’ republic melds participatory political democracy with a “partnership economy” of the sort that
seems prerequisite to participatory political democracy itself. I contrast producers’ republics with “banana”
republics, which are feudal societies whose leaders falsely label them republics. Feudal societies, in turn, are
societies in which ownership of productive resources is concentrated in very few hands, with everyone else
dependent upon those owners for their livelihoods—in effect, serfs, peasants, sharecroppers, or their latterday
equivalents.
6 For the fuller story, see Robert Hockett & Raymond Howze, Chaka’s Windows: Works and Days in
the Life of a Homeless Entrepreneur (2005) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
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odd that my dissertation-in-progress was in a sense about my new friends, on
the one hand, while our chats remained chatty and dissertation-irrelevant on
the other hand.
At length I decided to rectify the “disconnect.” I began spending days and
evenings under the bridge where my homeless friends lived, camping there
with them and in effect joining a tribe or big family. Many lessons emerged
from this lengthy encounter, but two seemed especially important.
The first lesson was that most of my friends, though hardworking and
clever, found contemporary patterns of wage-laboring and work/life separation
intolerably alienating. They had accordingly come in effect to form a sort of
working communion or “homeless kibbutz” that they both “owned” and
“lived.”7 This was an organizational option not clearly open to them as off-therack business form prior to effectively stumbling into fashioning it themselves.
The second lesson was that my friends earned a fair bit of money through
car washing but had no satisfactory means of saving it, hence of accumulating
or productively investing it. There was accordingly little accumulation, little
consolidation of gains, little building or growth on the part of my new friends’
old business. Things just continued—including my friends’ homeless status—
in a suboptimal “holding pattern.”
My friends and I ended up taking two courses of action, each
corresponding to one of the two mentioned “lessons.” The first was to start
what we called a “shoebox bank.” My friends would first pop by my flat,
which I maintained while living under the bridge so as to have an address and a
shower. There they’d “deposit” spare cash into shoeboxes that bore their
names, initial ledgers, which I would initial as well, then “withdraw” on an asneeded basis. In time, several of my friends saved enough money to pay union
dues, with which they secured well-paying auto plant jobs.8 Two even returned
to the blue-collar middle class.
The second course of action was to draft articles of partnership for those of
my friends under the bridge who wanted to formalize the kibbutz-like
arrangement I mentioned above. They planned to share a work space, an
adjoining living space (donated on an inexpensive leasehold basis by a local
7

As one “lives” a particular “way of life.”
So much for the “kibbutz” preference, you might think in response. Yet these fellows regularly
returned to the camp to rejoin their “family” for dinner and recreation in the evenings, sometimes even picking
the squeegees back up and working a bit for old times’ sake.
8
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church led by a remarkable pastor), ownership of their auto-detailing business,
and all earnings. In putting this commune-cum-enterprise together, we brought
my friends’ world itself into more complete commerce with the wider world
around them. We made of them stakeholders in the American prospect. We
materialized, in this sense, their participation in our economy, hence in a
manner their citizenship in our polity.
Now the first experiment is that with the most obvious purchase on the
subjects discussed in Professor Baradaran’s new article. For the tale of what
made it necessary for a first-year law student and a group of his homeless
friends to fashion a “bank” out of shoeboxes is effectively the tale that’s now
told in her important new study. For this very reason, however, the second
experiment that I have mentioned also is critical to Professor Baradaran’s
story, and hence to the story of our nation’s political-economic and consequent
civic degradation in recent decades. And that is a story we must take to heart if
proposals of the kind made by Professor Baradaran are to yield real fruit.
There is a very tight link, I shall argue, between how we configure and
conduct our enterprise and how we configure and conduct our finance. We
cannot fully describe what an optimally inclusive and sustainable banking and
broader financial system would look like without also specifying what an
optimally participatory productive culture and attendant mode of capital
accumulation would look like. The steps pursuant to which we lost sight of the
first—the steps culminating in the subject of Professor Baradaran’s article—
were accordingly likewise the steps pursuant to which we lost sight of the
second. They were the increments by which we ceased being productive
republicans, in the Founders’ sense of “republic,” and in so doing
dematerialized citizenship while regressing toward neo-feudal productive and
financial arrangements.
In what follows, then, I shall begin with the first fall from productive
republican grace and Professor Baradaran’s account of it—the departure from
equal banking and credit opportunity among mutual owners of the sort that
must underwrite equal productive opportunity among the same. Then I will
turn to the second such fall—that from equal productive opportunity itself. My
hope in so doing will be to draw out the sense in which both falls are one—
hence to show that the proposals that Professor Baradaran makes at the end of
her article are so important that they must ultimately be accompanied by more
ambitious complements on the “real” side of our economy.
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II. FROM BANKED TO BILKED: PRODUCTIVE REPUBLICAN VERSUS BANANA
REPUBLICAN FINANCE
You might not know it were you to read the present back into the past, but
the United States actually has a distinguished tradition of what I am calling
“productive republican” finance. It is a tradition pursuant to which productive
assets were deliberately spread broadly among diligent citizens ready to better
the lives of themselves, their families, and ultimately their communities
through thoughtful, hard work.
Historically, the tradition is rooted in two complementary sources: first, an
implicitly opportunity-egalitarian, “productive yeoman” colonial culture and
subsequent national self-image, stemming in large measure from the Civic
Republican and Classical Liberal ideological origins of the American
republic;9 and second, an attendant suspicion of large aggregations of financial
capital, stemming ultimately not only from the inconsistency of such
aggregations with equal opportunity and productive yeomanry themselves, but
also from many of the Founders’ and their forebears’ personal experiences, as
agronomists, with exploitative absentee London banking concerns across the
Atlantic.10
The practical and legal consequences of this vision, where American
banking and finance are concerned, were pronounced. Banking institutions
were, by regulation, deliberately kept small and inherently local. The
government routinely acted pursuant to policies and programs—in the form of
access to resources, vocational education, and “start-up” funding—meant to
channel productive opportunity to broad swathes of the (white male)
population.11 Such were among the underlying determinants of what has been
called the “market revolution” in early nineteenth-century America.12 They
continued to operate via statutory restrictions on interstate banking and
9 See Hockett, Jeffersonian Republic, supra note 3, at 49–55; Hockett, Whose Ownership?, supra note 3,
at 5–28; see also Hockett, Stock Ownership Plans, supra note 3, at 867–69, 880–85 (discussing the Civic
Republican and Classical Liberal approaches to income independence and responsible investment in the
context of modern securities ownership).
10 See, e.g., STANLEY ELKINS & ERIC MCKITRICK, THE AGE OF FEDERALISM 79–92 (1993); see also
Hockett, Jeffersonian Republic, supra note 3, at 49–55; Hockett, Whose Ownership?, supra note 3, at 5–28.
11 See, e.g., Hockett, Jeffersonian Republic, supra note 3, at 98–153; Hockett, Stock Ownership Plans,
supra note 3, at 868–69; Hockett, Whose Ownership?, supra note 3, at 9–10.
12 For more on this period, see generally, for example, CHARLES SELLERS, THE MARKET REVOLUTION:
JACKSONIAN AMERICA, 1815–1846 (1991). For a fascinating account of the domestic economic thought of the
time, see generally PAUL K. CONKIN, PROPHETS OF PROSPERITY: AMERICA’S FIRST POLITICAL ECONOMISTS
(1980).
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branching that remained in place until well into the 1990s, as well as through
community reinvestment norms and Progressive and New Deal–era
government-sponsored mortgage-, educational-, and small business-financing
innovations that worked very well till the same time.
What, then, occurred during the latter period to change things? What was
so special about the mid-1990s and the years that led up to them?
A particular strength of Professor Baradaran’s article is precisely its tracing
the transformation back to the fateful 1970s and 1980s. Another such strength
is its tracing the change through its salient manifestations in a particularly
important institutional context, where productive republican finance is
concerned—viz., the precincts of several distinctively American, mutually
owned financial institution types whose nurturing regulatory regimes were
eviscerated over the course of the two decades that came to a close at the turn
of the last century.
The mutually owned institutions of what I call “democratic” or “productive
republican” finance upon which Professor Baradaran concentrates are credit
unions, savings and loans, and so-called “Morris Banks” and industrial loan
companies. In all three cases, Professor Baradaran finds a shared historical
development pattern. First comes cooperative invention in response to a
broadly experienced necessity. Then comes a growth dialectic of mutually
reinforcing (a) proliferation on the one hand, and (b) legislative notice,
blessing, and prudential regulation on the other hand. Finally, once each of the
institution types in question has by and large accomplished its mission of
bringing the erstwhile non-well-to-do into the latterday “yeomanry”—the
storied American “middle class”—it falls victim to its own success, on
Professor Baradaran’s telling, and there emerges a new dialectic of mutually
reinforcing sharp competition and deregulation, culminating in decline and
demutualization.
Where does this leave us, where finance for the non-well-to-do and the
“working poor”—now, alas, a rapidly growing class—is concerned? In one
sense, the answer lies in the story with which I began this Essay. It leaves us
with sizeable numbers of folk like my bridge friends, whose only hope of
participating in that would-be productive republic which we take ourselves
ideally to constitute lies in the occasional amateur do-gooder ready to start up a
“shoebox bank.” In another sense, the answer lies in the fuller phenomenology
of exploitative check-cashing, payday-lending, and other fringe-banking
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“services” whose operations and extent Professor Baradaran describes
extensively in the first part of her article.13
In effect, then, the arc traced by Professor Baradaran’s article is that from a
late nineteenth- and twentieth-century political economy in which some
banking institutions serviced those who had already accumulated capital while
more banking institutions serviced those in the process of building up capital,
to a twenty-first-century political economy in which few of the latter
institutions survive, while a multitude of fringe financial institutions prevent
growing numbers of Americans from accumulating capital at all by exploiting
their desperate straits. This doesn’t sound good. It sounds like bananarepublican, not productive-republican, banking.14 But what can we do about it?
The answer, I think, requires we first cast a glance at the “real” economy
counterpart to the “banking” economy story that’s told so ably by Professor
Baradaran.
III. FROM TRADESMEN TO BONDSMEN: PRODUCTIVE-REPUBLICAN
PROPRIETORSHIP VERSUS BANANA-REPUBLICAN “WAGE SLAVERY” AND
UNEMPLOYMENT
As noted above, America’s productive-republican financial tradition had a
real economy complement. That was the yeoman ideal of the largely autarkic,
civically engaged, productive agrarian household. This ideal found expression
in much more than bank-regulatory and broader finance-regulatory policy.
Indeed, productive-republican finance-regulatory policy was very much the tail
to American democratic development’s “dog.”
Early American property law abandoned British common law
primogeniture precisely in order to ensure a broad ownership of the newly
conquered continent’s most conspicuous resource—arable land.15 Subsequent
late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century federal legislation, most notably
the Northwest Ordinance, had the same aim.16 Later still, the Homestead and
Land Grant Acts of the second half of the nineteenth century, not to mention
the Free Soil and Free Labor movements that pushed for them, reflected a
national policy favoring a broad spread of productive assets—including
vocationally relevant higher education in the Land Grant Act case—over a
13
14
15
16

See Baradaran, supra note 4, at 485–97.
See supra note 5 for a reminder of the meaning of this distinction.
See Hockett, Jeffersonian Republic, supra note 3, at 99–100.
See id. at 99–102; Hockett, Whose Ownership?, supra note 3, at 11–14.
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population of industrious, civically engaged, and responsibly productive
republican citizens.17 These enactments enjoyed at least one finance-regulatory
counterpart, too: the National Bank Act of 1863.
As the productive and populational center of gravity of the nation shifted,
over the course of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, from rural
agrarian to urban industrial and commercial, American economic and broader
public policy for a time faltered over how best to adapt the productive
republican ideal, which had presumed a largely agrarian economy since its
inception in pre-imperial Rome, to the new circumstance.18 The difficulty
found reflection in growing wealth disparities and labor pauperization during
the so-called “Gilded Age” of the late nineteenth century. The Progressive
movement that emerged in response to that age marked the first flowering of
productive
republicanism’s
adaptation
to
industrialization
and
commercialization. The movement’s signal accomplishments were too
numerous to enumerate here. But they included the development of those
distinctively American financial institutions that figure into Professor
Baradaran’s article, as well as the Federal Reserve Act of 1913.
Notwithstanding the gains made by the Progressives, pronounced incomeand wealth-disparities, which are inherently market-destabilizing over time,19
continued to grow in America, albeit at a slower pace, until the years following
the First World War. At that point they spiked, rendering the so-called
“Roaring Twenties” the most financially volatile decade on record until the
2000s.20 The upshot of these developments was the inflation of two classic
debt-fueled asset price bubbles, one in real estate, the other in corporate
equities, which both peaked and burst, respectively, in 1928–1929.21 The
17 See Hockett, Jeffersonian Republic, supra note 3, at 99–102; Hockett, Whose Ownership?, supra note
3, at 11–14. See generally CONKIN, supra note 12 (discussing how, in the mid-nineteenth century,
congressional debates centered around economic issues); ERIC FONER, FREE SOIL, FREE LABOR, FREE MEN:
THE IDEOLOGY OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR (1970) (explaining that the Republican
response to poverty was to encourage migration westward through homestead acts); SEAN WILENTZ, CHANTS
DEMOCRATIC: NEW YORK CITY AND THE RISE OF THE AMERICAN WORKING CLASS, 1788–1850 (1984)
(detailing the history of American capitalism, particularly the history of early industrialization in New York).
18 See Hockett, Jeffersonian Republic, supra note 3, at 102–04; Hockett, Whose Ownership?, supra note
3, at 13–15.
19 See Robert Hockett & Daniel Dillon, Income Inequality and Market Fragility: Some Empirics in the
Political Economy of Finance 2-3 (Jan. 21, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2204710.
20 See id. at 33–34; see also RICHARD VAGUE & ROBERT HOCKETT, DEBT, DEFLATION, AND DEBACLE:
OF PRIVATE DEBT WRITE-DOWN AND PUBLIC RECOVERY 21 (2013), http://www.interdependence.org/wpcontent/uploads/2013/04/Debt-Deflation-and-Debacle-RV-and-RH1.pdf.
21 See VAGUE & HOCKETT, supra note 20, at 9–10, 21.
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ensuing Fisher-style debt-deflation, later named the “Great Depression,”
brought a second wave of progressive legislation that built upon and
consolidated the productive-republican gains made by the Progressives a
generation before.22 Again there were finance-regulatory complements to these
enactments during the New Deal era just as there had been in earlier eras—
indeed, there were many.
What all of the New Deal enactments had in common was their building
upon the Progressive Era’s accomplishments to foster the continuing
development of an industrial-era counterpart to the primarily agrarian yeoman
class of the previous century, and thereby carry the productive republican ideal
into the modern era.23 The primary focus in so doing was on the real economy
prerequisites to that goal’s accomplishment—in particular, “living” wages and
job security, widespread homeownership, and a robust social safety net—while
a secondary but no less important focus was on regulating finance in a manner
that kept it subservient to the needs of the productive republican real
economy.24
Following the Second World War, New Deal-era policies largely continued
for another three decades. What, then, changed on the real economy side of the
ledger during the 1970s, in such manner as could induce those changes to the
financial economy side of the same noted above in the previous Part? What in
the real economy, in other words, brought on the changes that Professor
Baradaran describes in the banking economy? The answer comprises two
mutually complementary components.
First, arms-race, space-race, and mounting Vietnam War expenditures
during the 1960s, laid atop Johnson-era Great Society programs and the United
States’ global role as consumer of last resort, placed ultimately unsustainable

22 See Hockett, Jeffersonian Republic, supra note 3, at 105–10. See generally MICHAEL HILTZIK, THE
NEW DEAL: A MODERN HISTORY (2011) (discussing the factors contributing to the Great Depression and
studying the development of the New Deal); WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT AND THE
NEW DEAL, 1932–1940 (1963) (analyzing President Roosevelt’s contribution to the development of the New
Deal).
23 See in particular Hockett, Jeffersonian Republic, supra note 3, at 104–17 on this point.
24 See Hockett, Jeffersonian Republic, supra note 3, at 105–10. Much of the work cited supra, note 3,
and discussed infra, Part IV, is prompted by the thought that the Progressive movement’s and the New Deal’s
accomplishment must be consummated by plans that supplement secure labor incomes with secure capital
incomes for a much broader swathe of the population. That would make for a closer analogue to what land was
until the late nineteenth century.
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inflationary pressures upon the U.S. dollar.25 Ensuing consumer price
inflations served ultimately both (a) to undermine prudential bank regulations
aimed at preventing interest rate competition and concomitant speculative
investment behavior on the part of depository institutions and (b) to
delegitimize the Keynesian underpinnings of progressive post–New Deal fiscal
and monetary policies.26 The latter in turn invited a backlash from
“Monetarist” and yet more reactionary circles of economists and would-be
policy advisors, as well as from conservative politicians ready to listen to
them.27
Second, mounting civil unrest in the form of protests against (a) the
aforementioned arms race and Vietnam War activities and (b) ongoing racial
injustice, in combination with the Democrat-sponsored Civil Rights Act of
1964, brought additional reactionary impetus, this time from conservative and
racialist quarters in the American South and elsewhere.28 The Republican
Party, never friendly after the nineteenth century to progressive economic
policies in any event, successfully exploited this reaction, prizing many white
southern voters away from the Democratic Party and thereby winning repeated
national electoral victories, commencing with 1968.29 That not only brought
anti-Progressive politicians into office, but also opened the door to growing
influence on the part of the aforementioned reactionary economists.30
The upshot of these developments was profound and far reaching. Taxation
grew steadily less progressive and social safety nets were drawn in over the
ensuing decades.31 Collective bargaining rights came under threat first from
Orwellianly named “right to work” statutes legislated in conservative states,
then from the federal government itself as the Republican Party consolidated

25 See Robert Hockett, Bretton Woods 1.0: A Constructive Retrieval for Sustainable Finance, 16 N.Y.U.
J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 401, 412 (2013) [hereinafter Hockett, Bretton Woods]; see also VAGUE & HOCKETT,
supra note 20, at 21; Robert Hockett, Daniel Alpert & Nouriel Roubini, The Way Forward: Moving from the
Post-bubble, Post-bust Economy to Renewed Growth and Competitiveness 29 (Cornell Law Sch., Research
Paper No. 12-01, 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1987139; Hockett &
Dillon, supra note 19 at 2–3.
26 See, e.g., Robert Hockett, A Fixer-Upper for Finance, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 1213, 1272–73 (2010).
27 See Hockett, Bretton Woods, supra note 25, at 412.
28 See John E. Roemer, Ideology, Social Ethos, and the Financial Crisis, 16 J. ETHICS 273, 280–81
(2012).
29 See id. at 276–77. This was the vaunted “southern strategy” promoted by Kevin Phillips, then an aid to
presidential candidate Richard M. Nixon. See id.
30 See id. at 277.
31 See generally id. (discussing a fundamental shift in attitudes toward taxation and wealth distribution as
a result of political acquiescence).
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its gains during the Reagan era.32 Labor-protective legislation more generally
lost momentum for the same reason, as well as in response to steadily
expanding trade liberalization—first under the GATT, then under NAFTA, and
ultimately under the WTO agreements. After nearly a century of steady gains
in both income shares and working conditions, American labor suddenly found
itself competing with a veritable global reserve army of underprotected,
unprotected, and even prison labor abroad. Real wage and salary incomes
accordingly ceased rising during the 1970s, while capital incomes at the top of
the national distribution steadily increased their share, soon capturing nearly all
gains in the national income.33
The rise in capital’s share of national income gains, combined with the
inflation rates of the 1970s and early 1980s, induced further deregulation of
financial institutions as well. Inflation rendered the real rate of interest on thrift
and then bank deposits negative, leading growing numbers of depositors to
place their savings in mutual funds, which were permitted to make riskier
investments than depository institutions and offer correspondingly higher
returns on “deposits,” instead.34 The growing constituency for these investment
vehicles came in time to cite capital’s growing share of the national income as
a justification for allowing investment companies to offer more bank-like
options, including mutual funds with check-writing privileges. The more banklike these institutions became, the more urgent the lobbying by bona fide banks
for permission to offer higher returns on deposits and make the riskier sorts of
investments necessary to render them possible. Thus commenced the long
march of financial deregulation that stretched from the late 1970s into the early
years of the present century, a story whose consequences for non-well-to-do
would-be thrift depositors Professor Baradaran’s article narrates so well.
IV. THE TWO FALLS ARE ONE: BANANA LABOR, BANANA FINANCE, AND
WHAT MUST BE DONE
In light of the foregoing, I am of course sympathetic to the proposals that
Professor Baradaran makes at the end of her article, all of which involve public
facilitation—and in one case outright public provision—of small-scale banking

32 For more on the history of right to work legislation, see generally, for example, Charles W. Baird,
Right to Work Before and After 14(b), 19 J. LAB. RES. 471 (1998).
33 See Roemer, supra note 28, at 281; see also Hockett, Alpert & Roubini, supra note 25, at 3.
34 For more on this history, see generally MATTHEW P. FINK, THE RISE OF MUTUAL FUNDS: AN INSIDER’S
VIEW (2011).
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for the less well-to-do.35 I am skeptical, however, that much can be
accomplished this way in the absence of serious counterpart action on the real
side of the economy.
Small-scale community reinvestment, development banking, and
microlending, as well as reenlisting the Postal Service as a savings outlet for
the financially humble, are all very good ideas—particularly the latter, in my
view.36 In effect, they offer means of effecting more systematically and
reliably, on a much larger scale and with no pretense or consequent expectation
that they will be hugely profitable, that which the “shoebox bank” with which I
opened this Essay accomplished. That is nothing to sneeze at, both because it
can render what already are difficult lives appreciably less difficult, and
because it can facilitate modest degrees of capital accumulation among at least
some constituents—something which the remarkable Professor Michael
Sherraden and colleagues have long shown to yield manifold benefits to
beneficiaries and, in some cases, their families.37
My only concern with proposals of this sort, then, is with the danger that
they can raise false hopes, consequent disillusionment, and long-term
complacency in the absence of real, productive republican reform on the real
side of the economy. Utopian stories of Muhammed Yunus’s bringing his
magic to Arkansas during the Clinton governorship, of South Shore Bank’s
revitalizing South Side Chicago, and of the transformative “miracles” of
compound interest and financial innovation, recall, were staples of the
illusorily prosperous Clinton years.38 It all looked, sounded, and felt very good
till it turned out to be castles in air built on mountains of tax code- and
regulator-encouraged, bubble-inflating private debt. Even the vaunted federal
surpluses of the end of the era were but the public sector correlates of those
steadily mounting private sector deficits. Meanwhile, real incomes, in contrast
to unsustainably bubble-inflated stock market, then housing wealth, continued
to stagnate.39

35

See Baradaran, supra note 4, at 533–47.
See id. for Professor Baradaran’s elaboration of these suggestions.
37 See, for example, Hockett, A Jeffersonian Republic, supra note 3, at 78 n.84, for more on the work of
Professor Sherraden and colleagues.
38 See Roemer, supra note 28, at 300, for more on this. For more on the period during which
microlending was a “hot topic” in American policy circles, see, for example, Mark Shreiner & Jonathan
Morduch, Opportunities and Challenges for Microfinance in the United States, in REPLICATING
MICROFINANCE IN THE UNITED STATES 19–61 (James H. Carr & Zhong Yi Tong eds., 2002).
39 Hockett, Alpert & Roubini, supra note 25, at 10.
36
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We still have done nothing about that as a polity in over forty years now.
Real wealth will not really grow, below the top of the distribution, until real
incomes again grow below the top of the distribution. Asset accumulation
programs will do little until there is something to accumulate. Banks for the
people whose prospects concern Professor Baradaran and me—including the
Occupy Money Cooperative on whose board I sit—will do little for their
beneficiaries until they have something to save.
What, then, are we going to do? An excellent start—but only a start—
would be both to adopt Professor Baradaran’s proposals and to begin
reinstating, slowly but steadily, productive-republican policies of the kind
referenced above in connection with the Progressive and New Deal
movements. The nation must first act to write down the mortgage debt that
continues to drag down growth and employment-inducing consumer
expenditure.40 It must also undertake a serious program of nationwide
infrastructural renewal, employing idle labor and raising real wages in the
process.41
In the longer term, the nation must renew and extend collective bargaining
rights for labor—including retail, fast food, and service labor, which now
represent a much larger part of the labor force than does manufacturing labor.
It must also reintroduce seriously progressive income and, especially, estate
taxation, using the proceeds to revitalize essential social safety nets and
productive education at all levels. Meanwhile, where global economic relations
are concerned, it must finally act to render continued liberal trading
arrangements contingent upon foreign labor’s enjoyment of the same standards
as American labor, and foreign-manufactured products’ being subject to the
same quality standards as American-manufactured products.42
40

See id. at 18. See generally Robert Hockett, It Takes a Village: Municipal Condemnation Proceedings
and Public/Private Partnerships for Mortgage Loan Modification, Value Preservation, and Local Economic
Recovery, 18 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 121 (2012) (arguing that municipal governments should exercise their
eminent domain powers to restore the mortgage markets); Robert Hockett, Paying Paul and Robbing No One:
An Eminent Domain Solution for Underwater Mortgage Debt, in 19 CURRENT ISSUES ECON. & FIN., No. 5,
2013, at 1 (same).
41 See Hockett, Alpert & Roubini, supra note 25, at 5–6; see also Robert C. Hockett & Robert H. Frank,
Public Infrastructure Investment, Renewed Economic Growth, and the U.S. Fiscal Position 2 (Cornell Law
Sch., Research Paper No. 12-04, 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
1987656.
42 See Hockett, Bretton Woods, supra note 25, at 453–66; Hockett, Alpert & Roubini, supra note 25, at
28–29; cf. Robert Hockett, Insource the Shareholding of Outsourced Employees: A Global Stock Ownership
Plan, 3 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 357 (2008) (proposing that, in response to the losses incurred from globalization,
the nation should channel gains from globalization to outsourced employees).
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In the still longer term, the nation must work to construct a global centralbank-like institution that supplies global liquidity in the form of a bona fide
global currency not issued by any one nation as soon as possible; the
alternative is continued overvaluation of the dollar relative to other currencies,
with consequent depressive effects upon domestic production and
employment.43 It should also forthrightly embrace an employer-of-last-resort
function for the federal government, enabling the latter to influence domestic
wage rates through “open labor market operations” much as it influences
domestic borrowing rates through open (Treasury) market operations.44
Finally, the nation must begin developing asset-spreading programs that
ultimately render as broad a segment of the population as possible able to
derive income from capital sources even as it does so from labor sources.45 The
ultimate aim should be for each individual to replicate in her own income
portfolio, so far as possible, the same source composition as characterizes the
national income portfolio as a whole—an ideal that I call elsewhere the
Income-Compositional Symmetry principle.46 That will yield both optimal
diversification, where individual income risk minimization is concerned, and
automatic balancing, hence stabilizing, as between productive and absorptive
capacity where the macroeconomy is concerned.47 This was the ideal implicit
in the nation’s land-spreading programs during the agrarian era. It must be
updated to postagrarian conditions—not just in the form of home and higher
education finance, but in the form of corporate share-spreading finance.
It should also be noted that none of the gains realized through these
measures will be secure in the absence of sensible macro-prudential and
consumer-protective financial regulation.48 Wealth-destroying bubbles and
busts must be preempted proactively, and preventing exploitation of nonfinanciers who derive increasing portions of their incomes from capital assets
by sharp operators will become all the more urgent.
43

See Hockett, Bretton Woods, supra note 25, at 466–81.
See generally Robert C. Hockett & Saule T. Omarova, “Private” Means to “Public” Ends:
Governments as Market-Actors, 15 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 53 (2014) (encouraging governments to extend
their roles by pursuing traditionally public ends through traditionally private means).
45 For more on this ideal, see generally Hockett, Stock Ownership Plans, supra note 3; and Hockett,
Jeffersonian Republic, supra note 3, at 124–42.
46 See Robert Hockett, A Republic of Owners: Jeffersonian Democracy, Hamiltonian Finance, and a Plan
for Permanent Post-crisis American Renewal (2014) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
47 See id.
48 See generally Robert C. Hockett, The Macroprudential Turn: From Institutional “Safety and
Soundness” to Systemic “Financial Stability” in Financial Supervision, 8 VA. L. & BUS. REV. (forthcoming
2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2206189.
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It might well ultimately prove necessary to shrink and restrict the financial
“services” industry to little more than prudential asset management on behalf
of humble investors and quasi-public investment funds in which citizens
diversify holdings. Certainly the secondary markets will become less crucial
for purposes of lowering credit costs in the primary markets, as the general
public and its legislators grow increasingly cognizant of the fact that credit is
ultimately a public resource, rooted in the full faith and credit of the sovereign
taxing authority and its central bank, that the public partners with private
banking institutions in allocating. The limits on direct public provision of
credit are few in a nation that issues its own currency, and there is ultimately
no fundamental necessity that primary market credit outlets—banks—be
privately, shareholder owned either.
CONCLUSION: BANKING ON SHAREHOLDER SOCIETIES, NOT SHARECROPPER
SOCIETIES
The agenda just elaborated is obviously an ambitious one. I believe it is
nevertheless a necessary one. With nearly eleven million American home
mortgage loans still underwater and new household formation rates at twenty
year lows,49 with real wages and labor force participation rates still lingering at
forty year lows,50 and with GDP growth anemic even after five years of
innovative Fed monetary policy, it is likely that growing numbers of
Americans will be forced into straits like those of my friends mentioned at the
beginning of this Essay for years, if not decades, to come. As the experience
with those same friends suggests, progress can be made by ensuring that
banking and other financial services are available to those in such straits. As
the same experience also suggests, however, the ultimate utility of such
services will remain inherently limited in the absence of broadly owned assets,
well-compensated work, and associated incomes that can accumulate into
wealth with the help of those services.
Professor Baradaran’s article is a crucial first step in thinking through what
a recovery of finance for the now financially disenfranchised will look like. It
is also an important contribution to our ongoing effort to understand how the
disenfranchisement took place and, accordingly, how it might be both rectified
and avoided in future. As I hope I’ve made clear, however, an essential
complement to Professor Baradaran’s effort—indeed a sine qua non to its
49
50

See sources cited supra note 40.
See Hockett, Alpert & Roubini, supra note 25, at 7–9.
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success—will be the set of its real economy counterparts laid out above. Just as
my friends’ “shoebox” bank was conjoined to a “homeless kibbutz” that they
owned, so will Professor Baradaran’s and others’—including my own—efforts
to “rebank” the now under-banked have to be integrated with reemploying and
reendowing the now un- and underendowed. To do both of these things in
tandem will be to restore the productive republic we lost in the late twentieth
century and to rematerialize citizenship therein. May that urgent effort, so well
commenced by Professor Baradaran’s work, now kick into serious gear.

